Here is a very interesting narrative on the lead-up to Barack Obama's keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Click here to read the article from Chicago Magazine.
If you have any interest in presidential politics then this article will serve as a telling account of the speech that hoisted Obama into the national spotlight. It's equipped with fresh interviews from David Axelrod, Obama's personal media director, and other DNC insiders.
Obama has since been a national political figure but the article is quick to warn "the honor comes with the sort of baggage familiar to the Cubs: no Democratic keynoter of the past century has made it all the way to the presidency." (As a Cubs and an Obama fan, this is disheartening to hear)
Also, as a demonstration of my nerdiness, if you're interested in hearing the speech then go to iTunes. The speech is offered there for free. Trust me, I've already got it.
-Wyatt Earp
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Monday, May 28, 2007
Golwater's Failing Legacy
The Republican party in 1964 was divided between the moderates (led by Govs. Nelson Rockefeller, William Scranton and George Romney) and the conservatives (led by Barry Goldwater and Richard 'Dick' Nixon). Rockefeller was the candidate of choice for the moderates in the 1964 election, but a clear conservative choice was not as apparent. The Draft Goldwater organization was created to persuaded Barry Goldwater (Senator from Arizona) to join the race and lead the Republican party back to its conservative roots. Goldwater easily won the nomination due to the efforts of the Draft Goldwater boys in locking up many delegates (primary elections were non-binding back then) to the Goldwater cause. However, as history tells us, Goldwater was creamed in the 1964 general election by President Lyndon Johnson. What happened? Bill Middendorf offers some explanations in his book, Glorious Disaster, that I will explore here:
Amateurs trying to beat a Professional
The simple reason that Goldwater won the Republican nomination, and even ran in the first place, was due to the Draft Goldwater. The Draft Goldwater organization, led by Peter O'Donnell and Clifton White, created a grassroots presence in every state due to local organizers (akin to Howard Dean's and Barack Obama's grassroots before national presence). Once Barry decided to "test the waters" and run for president, the hard work had already been done for him. All he had to do was lend his name.
With the Republican nomination lined up, it would seem prudent to hold over the effective bottom-up leadership that had sowed the seeds of his success. Barry Goldwater did no such thing. Fearful that O'Donnell and White were out to make a name for themselves, Barry turned the reigns over to two of his associates from Arizona, Denison Kitchel and William Baroody. Kitchel, a lawyer with no prior political experience, was made campaign manager and Baroody, an intellectual didn't need nobodies help, was hired to assist Kitchel in whatever capacity he saw fit.
Lyndon B. Johnson is often considered one of the greatest political minds of his generation. He wins and he wins dirty. Goldwater was fearful of opposing him for the presidency (JFK was originally going to be seeking a second term until his trip to Austin, Texas). One a side note LBJ is famed to have used his physical superiority (he was six foot three) to persuaded his friends and enemies alike. On another side note, LBJ was a hard worker and would often convene meetings in the bathroom because he didn't want to miss something important. Yes, LBJ fought dirty. And he was a professional.
"Professionalism" ultimately won the day. Middendorf is unapologetic for Kitchel and Baroody's actions (or lack thereof) in response to LBJ's attacks. Needless to say, Goldwater would have been better off if he had stuck with the team that garnered him success in the primaries, the Draft Goldwater team. At least then would have held together the grassroots campaign that could have undercut LBJ's attacks. While grassroots support is not enough to combat a national attack(see Howard Dean) it does lend your candidate credibility.
Image trumps Issues in the Eyes of the Public
Barry Goldwater lost because he did not maintain his image. He allowed himself to be defined by misquotes. Example one: Goldwater was asked about President Eisenhower's suggestion that the six American divisions in Europe could be reduced. Goldwater agreed that our forces could be cut as long as NATO commanders had the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. Middendorf tells us, "He meant, the commander of NATO should continue to have the authority- which was the practice in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations." The national media machine began running stories that Goldwater wanted any junior-level commander to have the power use nuclear weapons on a whim. Goldwater was officially the warmonger candidate with a loose trigger finger. Goldwater never attacked the issue head-on and lost his image and the election. Side note time, again: LBJ employed most, if not all, of Goldwater's suggestions for escalating the war in Vietnam. Ironically, LBJ labeled Goldwater was the pro-war candidate while asking the American people to vote for his moderate internationalism.
Example two: Asked if he would continue Social Security (a testy subject, then and now), Barry responded: "If a person can provide better for himself, let him do it." He then explained that he wished for Social Security to be voluntary. However, next days Concord Monitor read: "Goldwater sets goals: End Social Security, Hit Castro." This further was used to demonstrate his extremism. Viewed as a warmonger and an opponent of social programs, there was nowhere for a positive image to develop.
Example three: Even in the primaries Barry was labeled as an extremist who would steer the Republican Party hard right. Goldwater and his team knew this label well. Rockefeller had been throwing it at them for months, Kennedy had been saying it to reports (anticipating a second term run) and the media had been saying nothing else. Why then would you condone the use of extremism in your acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention? Hopefully, you know his now famous quote: "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." Again, the stuff about image comes back around. I like that Goldwater attacked the negative image head on; however, he did so by attempting to make a negative word appear positive. In politics some words will always be viewed as negative: "draft-dodger", "liar", and, of course, "extremism." While conservatives have had success in this tactic (liberal is now a negative term) this attempt was doomed from the onset. All Goldwater did was embrace the attributes that accompany one has been brandished as an extremist. He surrendered his image and lost the election.
Conclusion: Why should we care? Barry Goldwater has been banished to political obscurity; the proverbial footnote in American political history, but an important one. I could not help but think of John Kerry while reading Middendorf's account of Goldwater's defeat. Kerry lost his image from the moment George Bush started attacking and he never got it back. "I voted for it before I voted against it," does that ring a bell? Democrats have been losing the image battle for the past 13 years and Goldwater's run at the presidency can remind us (being Democrats) of the golden years of the Republic when Republicans were divided and had a problem maintain a positive image.
Amateurs trying to beat a Professional
The simple reason that Goldwater won the Republican nomination, and even ran in the first place, was due to the Draft Goldwater. The Draft Goldwater organization, led by Peter O'Donnell and Clifton White, created a grassroots presence in every state due to local organizers (akin to Howard Dean's and Barack Obama's grassroots before national presence). Once Barry decided to "test the waters" and run for president, the hard work had already been done for him. All he had to do was lend his name.
With the Republican nomination lined up, it would seem prudent to hold over the effective bottom-up leadership that had sowed the seeds of his success. Barry Goldwater did no such thing. Fearful that O'Donnell and White were out to make a name for themselves, Barry turned the reigns over to two of his associates from Arizona, Denison Kitchel and William Baroody. Kitchel, a lawyer with no prior political experience, was made campaign manager and Baroody, an intellectual didn't need nobodies help, was hired to assist Kitchel in whatever capacity he saw fit.
Lyndon B. Johnson is often considered one of the greatest political minds of his generation. He wins and he wins dirty. Goldwater was fearful of opposing him for the presidency (JFK was originally going to be seeking a second term until his trip to Austin, Texas). One a side note LBJ is famed to have used his physical superiority (he was six foot three) to persuaded his friends and enemies alike. On another side note, LBJ was a hard worker and would often convene meetings in the bathroom because he didn't want to miss something important. Yes, LBJ fought dirty. And he was a professional.
"Professionalism" ultimately won the day. Middendorf is unapologetic for Kitchel and Baroody's actions (or lack thereof) in response to LBJ's attacks. Needless to say, Goldwater would have been better off if he had stuck with the team that garnered him success in the primaries, the Draft Goldwater team. At least then would have held together the grassroots campaign that could have undercut LBJ's attacks. While grassroots support is not enough to combat a national attack(see Howard Dean) it does lend your candidate credibility.
Image trumps Issues in the Eyes of the Public
Barry Goldwater lost because he did not maintain his image. He allowed himself to be defined by misquotes. Example one: Goldwater was asked about President Eisenhower's suggestion that the six American divisions in Europe could be reduced. Goldwater agreed that our forces could be cut as long as NATO commanders had the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. Middendorf tells us, "He meant, the commander of NATO should continue to have the authority- which was the practice in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations." The national media machine began running stories that Goldwater wanted any junior-level commander to have the power use nuclear weapons on a whim. Goldwater was officially the warmonger candidate with a loose trigger finger. Goldwater never attacked the issue head-on and lost his image and the election. Side note time, again: LBJ employed most, if not all, of Goldwater's suggestions for escalating the war in Vietnam. Ironically, LBJ labeled Goldwater was the pro-war candidate while asking the American people to vote for his moderate internationalism.
Example two: Asked if he would continue Social Security (a testy subject, then and now), Barry responded: "If a person can provide better for himself, let him do it." He then explained that he wished for Social Security to be voluntary. However, next days Concord Monitor read: "Goldwater sets goals: End Social Security, Hit Castro." This further was used to demonstrate his extremism. Viewed as a warmonger and an opponent of social programs, there was nowhere for a positive image to develop.
Example three: Even in the primaries Barry was labeled as an extremist who would steer the Republican Party hard right. Goldwater and his team knew this label well. Rockefeller had been throwing it at them for months, Kennedy had been saying it to reports (anticipating a second term run) and the media had been saying nothing else. Why then would you condone the use of extremism in your acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention? Hopefully, you know his now famous quote: "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." Again, the stuff about image comes back around. I like that Goldwater attacked the negative image head on; however, he did so by attempting to make a negative word appear positive. In politics some words will always be viewed as negative: "draft-dodger", "liar", and, of course, "extremism." While conservatives have had success in this tactic (liberal is now a negative term) this attempt was doomed from the onset. All Goldwater did was embrace the attributes that accompany one has been brandished as an extremist. He surrendered his image and lost the election.
Conclusion: Why should we care? Barry Goldwater has been banished to political obscurity; the proverbial footnote in American political history, but an important one. I could not help but think of John Kerry while reading Middendorf's account of Goldwater's defeat. Kerry lost his image from the moment George Bush started attacking and he never got it back. "I voted for it before I voted against it," does that ring a bell? Democrats have been losing the image battle for the past 13 years and Goldwater's run at the presidency can remind us (being Democrats) of the golden years of the Republic when Republicans were divided and had a problem maintain a positive image.
Sunday, May 27, 2007
Book Review: Glorious Disaster
Book: Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater's Presidential Campaign And the Origins of the Conservative Movement
Author: J. William Middendorf
Review: Middendorf certainly had front-row seats for Barry Goldwater's failed 1964 presidential run. Middendorf was one of the founding members of the Draft Goldwater movement that pressured Goldwater into running, he then served as treasurer of Goldwater's campaign before settling in as the treasurer of the RNC. Once Nixon was elected, Middendorf became the US Ambassador to the Netherlands before becoming the Secretary of the Navy. Yes, to say the least, Middendorf had a front-row seat.
The book reads like it should: an insider's historical account of the events that led up to and through Goldwater's presidential run. Middendorf allots a lot of space for "setting the record straight", but not having read any other books on the 1964 election I cannot attest to how straight the record is after this book. It is a very quick read because Middendorf does not editorialize much while recounting events. However, this is a memoir so the reader is left with a single picture: Middendorf's picture. As a liberal, I did not feel that it was unnecessarily biased because he was as quick to called Goldwater overly-earnest as he was to call LBJ a dirty politician.
The book; however, did not meet my expectations in explaining two things A) Why did Goldwater lose and B) How did he precipitate the modern conservative movement. Granted, both of these questions are answer, but not to much depth. Middendorf explains that Goldwater lost because he was painted by two misquotes (that he would abolish Social Security and he would give ever NATO commander discretion over the use of nuclear weapons; we'll discuss these later). But, Middendorf does not use his front-row seat to answer the question: was Goldwater the man you thought he would be? Middendorf was clearly enamored by Goldwater having helped "draft" him to run for president, but his disastrous returns in November must have caused him to doubt. Middendorf even admits that he told Barry on election-eve that it was "in the bag." How could one not doubt the cause that the American people so readily rejects? Exposing his doubt would have allowed a better picture of the state of the conservative movement after Goldwater's defeat and would have set up Richard Nixon's decisive 1968 presidential victory better. Which leads us to question two.
How did Goldwater's disaster lead to the modern conservative movement? You know from political science class that the Democrats used to be the strong house in the South, and you also know that the South is now solidly Republican. This transformation, in presidential terms, began with Barry Goldwater. Barry won five southern states (South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Georgia) and set up Nixon's electoral success in the south. But what connected Goldwater to Nixon? After Goldwater's defeat we follow our author as he fits to keep the RNC financial system together, and we see Nixon slowly emerge onto the scene. Middendorf aids Nixon in his victory by helping him lock up most of Goldwater's delegates from 1964, but what was Nixon's connection to Goldwater? There is a philosophical tenet that was missed. We know the history but our author did not offer any new tidbits where he clearly could have.
In conclusion, the book is a great, quick read from as inside an insider as you will get. Especially those of you focused on presidential elections, campaigns, conservatism or finances will have special interest in this book.
RATING (1-10): 6.9
My next post will deal with my impressions of the history that this book offered up. More to come.
-Wyatt Earp
Author: J. William Middendorf
Review: Middendorf certainly had front-row seats for Barry Goldwater's failed 1964 presidential run. Middendorf was one of the founding members of the Draft Goldwater movement that pressured Goldwater into running, he then served as treasurer of Goldwater's campaign before settling in as the treasurer of the RNC. Once Nixon was elected, Middendorf became the US Ambassador to the Netherlands before becoming the Secretary of the Navy. Yes, to say the least, Middendorf had a front-row seat.
The book reads like it should: an insider's historical account of the events that led up to and through Goldwater's presidential run. Middendorf allots a lot of space for "setting the record straight", but not having read any other books on the 1964 election I cannot attest to how straight the record is after this book. It is a very quick read because Middendorf does not editorialize much while recounting events. However, this is a memoir so the reader is left with a single picture: Middendorf's picture. As a liberal, I did not feel that it was unnecessarily biased because he was as quick to called Goldwater overly-earnest as he was to call LBJ a dirty politician.
The book; however, did not meet my expectations in explaining two things A) Why did Goldwater lose and B) How did he precipitate the modern conservative movement. Granted, both of these questions are answer, but not to much depth. Middendorf explains that Goldwater lost because he was painted by two misquotes (that he would abolish Social Security and he would give ever NATO commander discretion over the use of nuclear weapons; we'll discuss these later). But, Middendorf does not use his front-row seat to answer the question: was Goldwater the man you thought he would be? Middendorf was clearly enamored by Goldwater having helped "draft" him to run for president, but his disastrous returns in November must have caused him to doubt. Middendorf even admits that he told Barry on election-eve that it was "in the bag." How could one not doubt the cause that the American people so readily rejects? Exposing his doubt would have allowed a better picture of the state of the conservative movement after Goldwater's defeat and would have set up Richard Nixon's decisive 1968 presidential victory better. Which leads us to question two.
How did Goldwater's disaster lead to the modern conservative movement? You know from political science class that the Democrats used to be the strong house in the South, and you also know that the South is now solidly Republican. This transformation, in presidential terms, began with Barry Goldwater. Barry won five southern states (South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Georgia) and set up Nixon's electoral success in the south. But what connected Goldwater to Nixon? After Goldwater's defeat we follow our author as he fits to keep the RNC financial system together, and we see Nixon slowly emerge onto the scene. Middendorf aids Nixon in his victory by helping him lock up most of Goldwater's delegates from 1964, but what was Nixon's connection to Goldwater? There is a philosophical tenet that was missed. We know the history but our author did not offer any new tidbits where he clearly could have.
In conclusion, the book is a great, quick read from as inside an insider as you will get. Especially those of you focused on presidential elections, campaigns, conservatism or finances will have special interest in this book.
RATING (1-10): 6.9
My next post will deal with my impressions of the history that this book offered up. More to come.
-Wyatt Earp
Inaugural Post
Greetings all who have dared this blog,
I cannot guarantee how active I will be with this blog, but I shall sure give it my best. I have always wanted to manage a journal (not a diary) or blog of some sort because I often feel the need to rant about politics, namely, but also about the Chicago Cubs. Mostly just those two things. Well, now is the time. I will be spending my summer in D.C. and I need to record my impressions if, for no other reason then to write to remember. So, please enjoy the read and please engage me in debate.
One thing that my advisor, the honorable Daniel Shea, told me during one of my classes was that our generation is fearful of heated debate. After spending enough time with Benjamin Sperry I know that to not be entirely true, but it applies to me. I usually only engage in heated debate if I initiate the debate myself and; therefore, am well-suited for the topic. So, this blog will hopefully act as a carthetic source of applying inner-demons to a healthy habit that will lead me to more easily act in casual debate. Please, encourage this in me. Thank you and farewell.
-Wyatt Earp
I cannot guarantee how active I will be with this blog, but I shall sure give it my best. I have always wanted to manage a journal (not a diary) or blog of some sort because I often feel the need to rant about politics, namely, but also about the Chicago Cubs. Mostly just those two things. Well, now is the time. I will be spending my summer in D.C. and I need to record my impressions if, for no other reason then to write to remember. So, please enjoy the read and please engage me in debate.
One thing that my advisor, the honorable Daniel Shea, told me during one of my classes was that our generation is fearful of heated debate. After spending enough time with Benjamin Sperry I know that to not be entirely true, but it applies to me. I usually only engage in heated debate if I initiate the debate myself and; therefore, am well-suited for the topic. So, this blog will hopefully act as a carthetic source of applying inner-demons to a healthy habit that will lead me to more easily act in casual debate. Please, encourage this in me. Thank you and farewell.
-Wyatt Earp
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